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SYMPOSIUM
COMPETITION POLICY IN
LATIN AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
Ana Julia Jatar*
The decade of the 1980s witnessed a worldwide trend
towards economic liberalization and the promotion of trade.
Latin America was no exception and during this period of
structural change, governments in the region substituted dis-
cretionary control over the economy with policies oriented to
promote efficiency, competition, and exports. Also, after leaving
behind the import substitution model, a variety of trade agree-
ments were negotiated among the countries of the region in
order to stimulate growth through exports.
This transition from protectionism to international compet-
itiveness required a profound structural adjustment to encour-
age competition and efficiency. With that purpose, together
with the lifting of trade barriers, new laws and regulations
have been implemented to change business practices and to
promote local rivalry. At the regional level, on the other hand,
efforts have been made to harmonize trade policies and to de-
velop common rules to organize business transactions among
countries.
* Ana Julia Jatar is a Senior Fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, in
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Nevertheless, after a decade of efforts, the development of
effective rules and solid institutions to support a market econo-
my is still a major task for Latin American countries. In this
context, competition policy has emerged as an important ele-
ment in the achievement of these goals. Domestically, a
healthy competition policy stimulates local rivalry among
firms, a key element for efficiency enhancement and interna-
tional competitiveness. Internationally, cooperation among
countries in the enforcement of antitrust laws encourages the
development of common rules to regulate trade across the
region.
There are important lessons to derive from the experience
of competition agencies in the region so far. The promotion of
competition in Latin America has been a much more complicat-
ed task than simply implementing antitrust laws. It is a wider
struggle to wrest market control from entrenched government-
protected monopolists and to challenge traditional
anticompetitive ethics from the business community. There are
still important challenges ahead in overcoming the risks pro-
vided by continuous interest group pressures. In the context of
regional economic integration, there are also new challenges
confronting these institutions that need to be analyzed. Among
others, determining the need for harmonizing policies, evaluat-
ing a common treatment for practices like international cartels
or mergers, which may have a supranational impact. In this
issue, the Brooklyn Journal of International Law addresses
most of these elements while analyzing some of the achieve-
ments on competition policy matters in the region.
It is clear from the papers presented that the concept of
antitrust, though not new in the region (some countries have
laws dating back to 1919), had not been seriously enforced
until the late 1980s when most counties reacted to their debt
crisis by liberalizing their economies. Today, 10 countries have
legislation and competition institutions on free competition:
Argentina (1919, amended in 1946, 1980 and currently under
review), Brazil, (1962, amended in 1990 and revised in 1994),
Colombia (1959, amended in 1992), Costa Rica (1994), Chile
(1959, revised in 1979), Jamaica (1993), Mexico (1934, replaced
in 1992), Panama (1996), Peru (1991, modified in 1994 and
1996), and Venezuela (1991). Since the late 1980s, antitrust
agencies in these countries have been promoting competition
issues and changing business attitudes across the region with
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different degrees of success.
Changes in attitudes are difficult to induce, but competi-
tion agencies in Latin America have been doing exactly that.
They have been deregulating markets, promoting reforms in
laws and institutions originally designed as barriers to entry.
They have also strongly opposed protectionist policies originat-
ed in other government agencies while punishing
anticompetitive behavior in both public and private enterpris-
es. The task has been overwhelming for these newly-created
institutions, which in many circumstances have been at the
verge of collapse due to effective political pressure from power-
ful interest groups. In order to survive such pressures most
agencies have pursued the strategy of developing strong juris-
prudence in record time. This has sometimes forced the under-
staffed agencies to decide complicated technical antitrust mat-
ters too quickly. Unfortunately, these pressing situations have
sometimes negatively affected the quality of the decisions.
In other words, owing to a long history of protectionism,
the promotion of competition in these countries can not be
circumscribed to antitrust enforcement, because they lack the
business ethics based on competition that makes antitrust
enforcement widely accepted in countries like the United
States. Promoting competition in rent-land and competition-
land are two completely different stories. In rent-land, for
example, consumers have to be convinced that competition is
better than price controls and producers have to be convinced
that the government is not there to protect them from com-
petitors. In rent-land, only other laws can change the institu-
tional and legal structures created to support state dirigism,
and they usually take years to be passed. In rent-land, most
government regulations on economic issues have been designed
as barriers to entry. In rent-land, policy makers have spent
years promoting inward-looking strategies in small economies,
which makes markets highly concentrated. In rent-land, corpo-
rations usually have tight control over their distribution chan-
nels. This characteristic hampers (after liberalization) the
benefits of potential external competition. In rent-land, compe-
tition advocacy and deregulation can take more time from
enforcers than punishing anticompetitive behaviors.
As Shanker Singham analyzes in his paper, in spite of
their intrinsic differences, countries in the process of economic
liberalization had two models to follow in their efforts to intro-
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duce effective competition rules: the European model based on
the provisions of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, and
the Sherman Act of the United States. And so they did. East-
ern European countries followed the European model, while
Latin American countries adopted rules from both systems,
depending on their legal traditions or the influence of commer-
cial partners. Mexico, for example, based its law on the United
States' Sherman Act after joining NAFTA, while Venezuela
adopted articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
There are important lessons to be derived from their expe-
riences so far, and there are still important challenges on the
horizon. The paper written by Gesner Oliveira, Competition
Policy in Brazil and MERCOSUR: Aspects of the Recent Experi-
ence, presents a thorough analysis of Brazil's recent experience
on competition policy enforcement. The article offers an over-
view of the different decisions in cartels, bid rigging, tied sales,
abusive prices, predatory pricing and cartels. The article de-
scribes the Brazilian experience with all its complexity, mak-
ing it an excellent example that is representative of the Latin
American reality. CADE's (Brazil's competition agency) in-
volvement in deregulation, competition advocacy, privatization,
and regulation of natural monopolies' policies are a good exam-
ple of the variety of policy issues Latin American agencies are
involved with.
Some of the lessons after a decade of antitrust enforce-
ment in the region are the following: first, a strong and trans-
parent competition policy is a good signaling device for foreign
investment, because it guarantees clear rules and a level play-
ing field for the business community. Second, the objective
followed by most agencies has been consumer welfare, and not
the defense of smaller competitors. Third, per se rules to pun-
ish hard core cartel behavior has worked better than the rule
of reason. Fourth, vertical agreements, on the other hand, are
very rarely punished. Fifth, there are mixed feelings on merger
control. Some countries like Peru prefer not to regulate merg-
ers, while others like Venezuela and Brazil have been very
active in that area. Sixth, distribution channel control by domi-
nant firms continues to be a headache for competition agen-
cies. For this reason, vertical mergers reducing barriers to
entry in distribution are often seen with good eyes by the agen-
cies by enforcers who have kept in mind that more than 50% of
the direct foreign investment in the region comes through
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mergers. Seventh, competition advocacy efforts have absorbed
much more time and resources than initially expected. The
lessons are many, and the challenges are more.
What are the challenges? What is the best set of rules for
the countries in the region? When and how should per se crite-
ria or rule of reason be used? What kind of institutions should
be responsible for enforcing the laws? What degree of indepen-
dence must they have? What is the role of competition policy
and antitrust enforcement within a process of trade liberaliza-
tion and, more specifically, in the creation of a free trade area?
What are the policy priorities when enforcing supranational
regulations? What are the objectives?
On these important questions, the papers presented in this
issue of the Brooklyn Journal of International Law are ex-
tremely useful and enlightening. With theoretical insights and
practical advice, these papers provide the elements for think-
ing about the challenges in a variety of ways.
Jos6 Tavares de Araujo, Jr. and Luis Tineo evaluate the
elements that make harmonization desirable for the promotion
of a free trade area. In their analysis of the MERCOSUR case,
they argue that the recent MERCOSUR protocol on competi-
tion policy constitutes a "new driving force" towards the conclu-
sion of the ongoing economic reforms in the member countries.
They also argue that the MERCOSUR experience will affect
the debate about antitrust issues in other forums, such as the
FTAA and the WTO.
In his paper, Shaping Competition Policy in the Americas:
Scope for Transatlantic Cooperation?, Shanker Singham com-
pares European and U.S. antitrust laws, analyzes the philo-
sophical foundations of both, and stresses the perils of the
"wholesale adoption" by emerging economies of the provisions
of one or the other. The paper surveys the current competition
regimes in different countries in Latin American and evaluates
whether a mixed "hybrid" system would be more suitable for
them. Mr. Singham also provides an interesting discussion on
how to approach not only the implementation of antitrust poli-
cies in individual countries, but also incorporation of the neces-
sary elements to evaluate the economic objectives at a supra-
national level.
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I am sure that this timely issue of the Brooklyn Journal of
International Law on competition policy in Latin America will
contribute towards a better understanding of antitrust in the
region and will also increase the quality of the debate of ex-
perts on the subject.
